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Abstract: Most of the decision procedures for symbolic analysis of protocols are limited
to a fixed set of algebraic operators associated with a fixed intruder theory. Examples
of such sets of operators comprise XOR, multiplication/exponentiation, abstract encryp-
tion/decryption. In this report we give an algorithm for combining decision procedures for
arbitrary intruder theories with disjoint sets of operators, provided that solvability of or-
dered intruder constraints, a slight generalization of intruder constraints, can be decided in
each theory. This is the case for most of the intruder theories for which a decision procedure
has been given. In particular our result allows us to decide trace-based security properties of
protocols that employ any combination of the above mentionned operators with a bounded
number of sessions.
Key-words: Cryptographic protocols, combination of decision procedures, equational
theories
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Combinaison de the´ories d’intrus
Re´sume´ : La plupart des proce´dures de de´cision pour l’analyse symbolique de proto-
coles cryptographiques s’appliquent a` un ensemble fixe´ d’ope´rateurs alge´briques lie´s a` une
the´orie e´quationnelle fixe´e. C’est le cas par exemple du OU-exclusif, du couple multiplica-
tion/exponentiation, des ope´rateurs de chiffrement/de´chiffrement abstraits. Dans ce rapport
nous donnons un algorithme permettant de combiner des proce´dures de de´cision pour des
syste`mes d’intrus et des the´ories e´quationnelles arbitraires tant que leurs d’ope´rateurs sont
disjoints et que la satisfaisabilite´ de contraintes d’intrus e´tendues par des contraintes d’ordre
est de´cidable dans chaque sous-the´orie. C’est le cas pour la plupart des syste`mes d’intrus qui
ont e´te´ e´tudie´s. En particulier notre re´sultat permet de de´cider les proprie´te´s de secret et
d’authentification des protocoles qui combinent toutes les ope´rations mentionne´es ci-dessus
pour un nombre borne´ de sessions.
Mots-cle´s : Protocoles cryptographiques, combinaison de proce´dures de de´cision, the´ories
e´quationnelles
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1 Introduction
1.1 Algebraic operators for cryptographic protocols analysis
Recently many procedures have been proposed to decide insecurity of cryptographic pro-
tocols in the Dolev-Yao model w.r.t. a finite number of protocol sessions [3, 6, 27, 25, 21].
Among the different approaches the symbolic ones [25, 10, 15, 5] are based on reducing the
problem to constraint solving in a term algebra. This reduction has proved to be quite
effective on standard benchmarks [11] and also permitted to discover new flaws on several
protocols [5].
However while most formal analysis of security protocols abstracts from low-level proper-
ties, i.e. certain algebraic properties of encryption such as the multiplicativity of RSA or the
properties induced by chaining methods for block ciphers, many real attacks and protocol
weaknesses rely on these properties (for a survey see [16]). For attacks exploiting the XOR
properties in the context of mobile communications see [8]. Also the specification of Just
Fast Keying protocol (an alternative to IKE) in [1] employs a set constructor that is idem-
potent and commutative and a Diffie-Hellman exponentiation operator with the property
(gy)z = (gz)y.
At an intermediate level encryption and decryption operations are sometimes defined by
explicit constructors and destructors as in [24, 17]. This allows to have a simple communica-
tion scheme similar to the applied pi calculus of Abadi and Fournet [2]. This approach has
also the advantage of revealing some new flaws in protocols [24]. It can be handled by some
analysis tool (at least for basic encryption/decryption theory) such as the NRL analyzer [23]
and TRUST system [3].
In this report we present a general procedure for deciding security of protocols in pres-
ence of algebraic properties. This procedure relies on the combination of constraint solving
algorithm for disjoint intruder theories, provided that solvability of ordered intruder con-
straints, a slight generalization of intruder constraints, can be decided in each theory. Such
combination algorithm already exists for solving E-unification problems [28, 4]. We have
extended it in order to solve intruder constraints on disjoint signatures. This extension
is non trivial since intruder deduction rules allow one to build contexts above terms and
therefore add some second-order features to the standard first-order E-unification problem.
Our approach is more modular than the previous ones and it allows us to decide inter-
esting intruder theories that could not be considered before by reducing them to simpler
and independant theories. For instance it allows one to combine the exponentiation with
abelian group theory of [26] with the Xor theory of [9]. This allows one to decide security
protocols at a more concrete level where encryption is described by mathematical functions.
1.2 A protocol with several algebraic operators
We consider in this section the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key protocol. This well-known
protocol is described in the Alice and Bob notation by the following sequence of messages,
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where the comma denotes a pairing of messages and {M}Ka denotes the encryption by the
public key Ka of A.
A→ B : {A,Na}Kb
B → A : {Na, Nb}Ka
A→ B : {Nb}Kb
Assume now that the encryption algorithm follows El-Gamal encryption scheme. The
public key of A is defined by three publicly-available parameters: a modulus pa, a base
ga and the proper public key g
a mod pa. The private key of A is a. Denoting expp the
exponentiation modulo p and ×p the multiplication modulo ϕ(p), and with new nonces k1,
k2 and k3 we can rewrite the protocol as:
A→ B : exppb(gb, k1), (A,Na)⊕ exppb(exppb(gb, b), k1)
B → A : exppa(ga, k2), (Na, Nb)⊕ exppa(exppa(ga, a), k2)
A→ B : exppb(gb, k3), (Nb)⊕ exppb(exppb(gb, b), k3)
In this simple exemple we would like to model the group properties of the Exclusive-
or (⊕), the associativity of exponential ((xy)z = xy×z), the group property of the expo-
nents. Several works have already been achieved toward taking into account these algebraic
properties for detecting attacks on a bounded number of sessions. Some procedures have
been proposed for specific theories like Exclusive-or, abelian goups (with exponential), . . . .
However none of these can analyse protocols combining several algebraic operators like the
example above. The algorithm given in this paper will permit to decide the trace-based
security properties of such protocols.
1.3 Examples of intruder theories
A convenient way to specify intruder theories in the context of cryptographic protocols is by
giving a set L of deduction rules that tell how the intruder can construct new messages from
the one she already knows and a set of equational laws E that are verified by the functions
that are employed in messages. These equations will be further processed as rewrite rules
in order to obtain a (possibly infinite) rewrite system R. We give here examples of intruder
theories. These examples are developed in Section 7.
1.3.1 Dolev Yao with explicit destructors
The intruder is given with a pairing operator and projections to retrieve the components
of a pair. There is a symmetric encryption operator se( , ) and an operator sd( , ) for the
decryption algorithm too. For conciseness we omit the public-key encryption specification.
LDY


x, y → 〈x, y〉
x → pi1(x)
x → pi2(x)
x, y → se(x, y)
x, y → sd(x, y)
EDY


pi1(〈x, y〉) = x
pi2(〈x, y〉) = y
sd(se(x, y), y) = x
INRIA
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Note that this theory is itself the union of two more simple theories, one with the pairing
operator and the projections and the other with the explicit encryption and decryption
operators.
1.3.2 XOR theory
The theory of the eXclusive-OR operator is given over the signature F⊕ = {0,⊕} by the
following set L⊕ of deduction rules and equations E⊕ over terms.
L⊕
{
x, y → x⊕ y
→ 0
E⊕


(x⊕ y)⊕ z = x⊕ (y ⊕ z)
x⊕ y = y ⊕ x
0⊕ x = x
x⊕ x = 0
1.3.3 Abelian group theory.
This intruder may treat messages as elements of an abelian group. We assume here there
is only one such group and that the composition law is · × ·, the inverse law is i(·) and the
neutral element is denoted 1.
L×


→ 1
x → i(x)
x, y → x× y
E×


(x× y)× z = x× (y × z)
x× y = y × x
1× x = x
x× i(x) = 1
1.3.4 Exponential and abelian groups
We consider multiplication and exponentiation in a finite but very large ring of order p. We
assume ϕ(p) (ϕ being the Euler function) is publicly known. This is consistent with Diffie-
Hellman scheme where p is prime and publicly available. We model this order as a parameter
of the ×p (multiplication modulo ϕ(p)), ip (inverse modulo ϕ(p)) and expp (exponentiation
modulo p) operation. In the following we fix the parameter p. This permits to simplify
notation by omitting this parameter in operator’s notations. An in-depths analysis of the
exponential taking into account the availability of ϕ(p) is out of the scope of this report.
The equational theory Eexp we consider on the signature Fexp = {exp( , ), i( ), × } is
given by the following axioms (richer axiomatizations lead to undecidability [22]).
Eexp =


exp(x, 1) = x
exp(exp(x, y), z) = exp(x, y × z)
(x× y)× z = x× (y × z)
x× y = y × x
1× x = x
x× i(x) = 1
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Since we assume ϕ(p) is known the intruder may compute products and inverse modulo
ϕ(p). The possible deductions are given by the set Lexp of deduction rules.
Lexp =


→ 1
x, y → exp(x, y)
x, y → x× y
x → i(x)
1.4 Related works
Recently several protocol decision procedures have been designed for handling algebraic
properties in the Dolev-Yao model [22, 7, 13, 9]. These works have been concerned by fixed
equational theories corresponding to a fixed intruder power. A couple of works only have
tried to derive generic decidability results for class of intruder theories. For instance, in
[17] Delaune and Jacquemard consider the class of public collapsing theories. These theories
have to be presented by rewrite systems where the right-hand side of every rule is a ground
term or a variable, which is a strong restriction. Comon and Treinen [14, 12] have also
investigated general conditions on theories for deciding insecurity with passive intruders.
1.5 Outline
In Section 2 we will first define basic notions about terms, substitutions and ordered term
rewriting. Then we introduce the notion of subterm values which is a notion of subterms
specific to this report, and we give some properties of this notion with respect to replacement.
In Section 3 we first give our modelisation of an intruder in Subsection 3.1. We also
prove the existence of special sequences of deductions called well-formed derivations. Then
we give the model for the cryptographic protocols we plan to analyze (Subsection 3.2) and the
reduction of some trace-based security properties to the feasability of an execution. Finally
we define constraint systems in Subsection 3.3, the satisfiability of which corresponding to
the feasability of an execution of a protocol.
In Section 4 we define with respect to a constraint system C a special kind of substitutions
called bound substitutions. We prove that whenever a constraint system C is satisfiable it is
satisfied by a bound substitution. We also prove that these substitutions are conservative
with respect to the subterms of C i.e. after application of a bound substitution the number
of subterms of C does not increase.
These results permit to define a combination algorithm for solving constraints systems
for the union of two intruders over disjoint signatures in Section 5. We prove its soundness
and completeness. The main disadvantage of this algorithm is that the constraint systems
in the sub-systems are not necessarily deterministic. This is a major drawback since all
decision procedures given so far assume the constraint systems are deterministic (except
in [29] but the long version [26] re-introduces a notion that has to be dynamically verified
during the verification process.)
INRIA
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This lead us to prove that the combination algorithm can be adapted so that it suffices to
decide the satisfiability of deterministic constraint systems in sub-theories. We have prefer
to put the definitions and lemmas necessary for this proof aside in Section 6 in order to
alleviate the reading of the report.
Finally we give in Section 7 some complexity results for the satisfiability in some in-
truder theories. The bound we give are tight and permit to extend some previously known
complexity results as well as to derive new ones.
2 Terms and subterms
2.1 Basic notions
We consider an infinite set of free constants C and an infinite set of variables X . For all
signatures G (i.e. a set of function symbols with arities), we denote by T(G) (resp. T(G,X ))
the set of terms over G ∪C (resp. G ∪C ∪ X ). The former is called the set of ground terms
over G, while the later is simply called the set of terms over G. Variables are denoted by x, y,
terms are denoted by s, t, u, v, and finite sets of terms are written E,F, ..., and decorations
thereof, respectively. We abbreviate E ∪ F by E,F , the union E ∪ {t} by E, t and E \ {t}
by E \ t.
In a signature G a constant is either a free constant or a function symbol of arity 0 in G.
Given a term t we denote by Var(t) the set of variables occurring in t and by Cons(t) the set
of constants occurring in t. We denote by Atoms(t) the set Var(t) ∪ Cons(t).A substitution
σ is an involutive mapping from X to T(G,X ) such that Supp(σ) = {x|σ(x) 6= x}, the
support of σ, is a finite set. The application of a substitution σ to a term t (resp. a set of
terms E) is denoted tσ (resp. Eσ) and is equal to the term t (resp. E) where all variables
x have been replaced by the term xσ. A substitution σ is ground w.r.t. G if the image of
Supp(σ) is included in T(G).
An equational presentation H = (G, A) is defined by a set A of equations r = t with r, t ∈
T(G,X ). For any equational presentation H the relation =H denotes the equational theory
generated by (G, A) on T(G,X ), that is the smallest congruence containing all instances
of axioms of A. By abuse of terminology we do not distinguish between an equational
presentation H over a signature G and a set A of equations presenting it and denote both
H. We will also often refer to H as an equational theory (meaning the equational theory
presented by H). An equational theory H is consistent if there exists at least one model
of H with more than one element. Equivalently a theory H is consistent if there does not
exists two free constants x and y such that x 6= y and x =H y.
The syntactic subterms of a term t are denoted Subsyn(t) and are defined recursively
as follows. If t is a variable or a constant then Subsyn(t) = {t}. If t = f(t1, . . . , tn) then
Subsyn(t) = {t}∪
⋃n
i=1 Subsyn(ti). The positions in a term t are sequences of integers defined
recursively as follows,  being the empty sequence. The term t is at position  in t. If u is a
syntactic subterm of t at position p and if u = f(u1, . . . , un) then ui is at position p · i in t
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for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We denote by t[p← s] the term obtained by replacing in t the syntactic
subterm at position p by s.
2.2 Definitions for the union of two signatures
In this paper, we consider 2 disjoint signatures F1 and F2, a consistent equational theory
E1 (resp. E2) on F1 (resp. F2). We denote by F the union of the signatures F1 and F2,
E the union of the theories E1 and E2. A term t in T(F1,X ) (resp. in T(F2,X )) is called
a pure 1-term (resp. a pure 2-term). We denote by Sign(·) the function that associates to
each term t 6∈ C ∪ X the signature (F1 or F2) of its root symbol. For t ∈ C ∪ X we define
Sign(t) = ⊥, with ⊥ a new symbol. The term s is alien to u if Sign(s) 6= Sign(u). We now
introduce a notion of subterm values of a term t. These are syntactic subterms of t that are
either equal to t or a strict maximal alien syntactic subterm of a subterm value of t.
Definition 1 (factors) The set of factors of a term t is denoted Factors(t) and is the set
of maximal syntactic strict subterms of t that are either alien to t or atoms.
Example 1 Consider F1 = {⊕, a, b, c} and F2 = {f} where f has arity 1. Then

Factors(f(f(a))⊕ (b⊕ c)) = {f(f(a)), b, c}
Factors(f(f(f(b)⊕ c))) = {f(b)⊕ c}
Factors(0) = ∅
We now define the notion of subterm values.
Definition 2 (Subterms) Given a term t, the set of its subterm values is denoted by Sub(t)
and is defined recursively by Sub(t) = {t} ∪
⋃
u∈Factors(t) Sub(u).
By extension, for a set of terms E, the set Sub(E) is defined as the union of the subterms
values of the elements of E.
Example 2 Consider F1 and F2 as in Example 1. Then

Sub(f(f(a))⊕ (b⊕ c)) = {f(f(a))⊕ (b⊕ c), f(f(a)), a, b, c}
Sub(f(f(f(b)⊕ c))) = {f(f(f(b)⊕ c)), f(b)⊕ c, f(b), b, c}
Sub(0) = {0}
This shows the difference with the notion of syntactic subterms.
In the rest of this paper and unless otherwise indicated, the notion of subterm will
refer to subterm values.
INRIA
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2.3 Congruences and ordered rewriting
In this subsection we shall introduce the notion of ordered rewriting [18] which is a useful
tool that has been utilized (e.g. [4]) for proving the correctness of combination of unification
algorithms. Let < be a simplification ordering on T(G) 1 assumed to be total on T(G) and
such that
  the minimum for < is a constant cmin ∈ C;
  non-free constants are smaller than any non-constant ground term.
Given a possibly infinite set of equations O on the signature T(G) we define the ordered
rewriting relation →O by s →O s
′ iff there exists a position p in s, an equation l = r in O
and a substitution τ such that s = s[p← gτ ], s′ = s[p← rτ ], and gτ > dτ .
It has been shown (see [18]) that by applying the unfailing completion procedure to a set
of equations H we can derive a (possibly infinite) set of equations O such that:
1. the congruence relations =O and =H are equal on T(F).
2. the ordered rewrite relation →O is convergent (i.e. terminating and confluent) on
T(F).
We shall say that O is an o-completion of H.
From now for sake of conciseness when we will say “the rewrite system →O” this will
mean “the ordered rewrite relation→O”, when will say “by convergence of O”, we will mean
“by convergence of →O on ground terms”.
The rewrite system →O being convergent on ground terms we can define (t)↓O as the
unique normal form of the ground term t for →O. A ground term t is in normal form, or
normalized, if t = (t)↓O. Given a ground substitution σ we denote by (σ)↓O the substitution
with the same support such that for all variables x ∈ Supp(σ) we have x(σ)↓O = (xσ)↓O. A
substitution σ is normal if σ = (σ)↓O.
Notations in this report. Applying unfailing completion to E = E1 ∪ E2, it is easy
to notice [4] that the set of generated equations R is the the disjoint union of the two
systems R1 and R2 also obtained by applying unfailing completion procedures to E1 and to
E2 respectively. (Since F1 ∩F2 = ∅ and the Ei are assumed to be consistent i.e. the identity
x =Ei y does not hold in either theory, the critical pair generation will produce only pure
equations.) We denote (t)↓ the normal form of a term t for the rewrite system →R. We
denote by Cspe the set containing the constants in F and cmin.
First let us show that when normalizing a term with R, we can handle equations intro-
ducing new variables by replacing these variables by the minimal constant cmin:
Lemma 1 Assume that g = d ∈ R, z ∈ Var(d) \ Var(g), and s →R s
′ with s = s[p ← gτ ],
s′ = s[p ← dτ ], gτ > dτ . Let us define the substitution σ such that for all variables x 6= z
we have xσ = xτ and zσ = cmin. Then we have also: s→R s[p← dσ]
1by definition < satisfies for all s, t, u ∈ T(G) s < t[s] and s < u implies t[s] < t[u]
RR n
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Proof. We only need to notice that gτ > dτ implies gσ > dσ since gτ = gσ and dτ > dσ
by the monotonicity properties of simplification orderings. 
Lemma 2 If H is a consistent equational theory then for any equation g = d in a presen-
tation of H with g 6= d if there exists a substitution τ such that gτ > dτ then g is not a
variable.
Proof. By contradiction assume g is a variable and there exists a ground substitution τ
such that gτ > dτ . By monotony we have g /∈ Var(d). Let τ ′ be a substitution of support
Var(d) and equal to τ on Var(d). Then for any ground term t we can build a substitution
τt of support Var(d) ∪ {g}: {
gτt = t
xτt = xτ
′ If x ∈ Var(d)
The equation g = d then implies that all ground terms t are equal to dτ . By transitivity of
the equality all ground terms are equal, which contradicts H has a model with more than
one element. 
The following lemma is an easy to prove but nonetheless fundamental result.
Lemma 3 Assume a non-constant ground term t has all its factors in normal form. Then
either (t)↓ ∈ Cspe ∪Factors(t) or Sign(t) = Sign((t)↓) and Factors((t)↓) ⊆ Cspe ∪Factors(t).
Proof. The assumption t is a non-constant ground term implies Factors(t) 6= ∅ and
Sign(t) 6= ⊥. If t is in normal form the result is trivial.
Otherwise consider a sequence of applications of rules of R: t = t0 →R . . . →R tn = t
′
and assume that at each step i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the term ti is minimal for < among the
terms r such that ti−1 →R r.
Let 0 ≤ i ≤ n be the last step in this sequence such that ti ∈ Cspe ∪ Factors(t) or
Sign(t) = Sign(ti) and Factors(ti) ⊆ Cspe ∪ Factors(t).
By contradiction assume i < n and assume the equation g = d ∈ R is applied on ti with
substitution τ to yield ti+1 with gτ > dτ . The minimality of ti+1 among terms r such that
ti →R ti+1 and Lemma 1 imply that for all variables x in Var(d)\Var(g) we have xτ = cmin.
By construction of R the terms g and d are pure terms and constants in d and g are non-free
constants.
By Lemma 2 g is not a variable and thus Sign(gτ) 6= ⊥. The choice of < implies if
g is a constant then so is d. In this case they are both in Cspeand we are done. Let us
assume now the set of factors of gτ is not empty. Since the factors of ti are in normal
form the rule is applied above the factors of ti. Thus we must have Sign(ti) = Sign(g) and
Factors(gτ) ⊆ Cspe ∪ Factors(ti). Thus for each variable x ∈ Var(g) either xτ ∈ Factors(ti)
or Factors(xτ) ⊆ Factors(ti) and Sign(xτ) = Sign(ti).
The above remark implies that:
  either d is a variable and dτ is a factor of t or in Cspe;
INRIA
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  or the factors of dτ are either in Cspe or are factors of t.
Now if the rule is applied at position  on t and if we are in the first case we have
ti+1 ∈ Factors(ti)∪Cspe. Else we necessarily have Sign(ti+1) = Sign(ti) and the above cases
imply that Factors(ti+1) ⊆ Cspe∪Factors(ti). Both cases contradict the maximality of i and
thus that i < n. Together with tn = (t)↓ this implies the Lemma. 
In the rest of this paper we will often used without justification the following consequence
of Lemma 3. First we see that if the factors of a term t are in normal form we have:
Sub((t)↓) ⊆ (Sub(t))↓ ∪ Cspe
By iterating along a bottom-up normalisation of a ground term t this inclusion also holds
for any ground term t. A useful case is when t is not ground but a ground, normalized
substitution σ is applied on t. In this case we have Sub(tσ) ⊆ Sub(t)σ ∪ Sub(σ). Since the
substitution σ is normal we have the following much used inclusion:
Sub((tσ)↓) ⊆ (Sub(t)σ)↓ ∪ Sub(σ) ∪ Cspe
2.4 Normalisation and replacements
The following lemma states that if all factors of a term t are in normal form then the
replacement of one of these factors commutes with the normalisation of t.
If Π is a set of positions in term t we denote by t[Π← v] the term obtained by putting
v at all positions of t that are in Π. We denote δu,v the replacement of u by v such that if
u appears at positions Πu as a subterm (i.e. as a subterm value) of t then tδu = t[Πu ← v].
We denote δu the replacement δu,cmin .
Lemma 4 Let t be a term such that its factors are in normal form. Let u and v be two
ground terms with u ∈ Factors(t) with u 6= (t)↓ and u, v are terms alien to t. Then (tδu,v)↓ =
((t)↓δu,v)↓.
Proof. Consider a sequence of rewrite steps: t→s1 t1 →s2 t2 · · · →sn tn = (t)↓, using rules
s1, . . . sn ∈ R and wlog assume Sign(t) = F1, Sign(u) 6= F1 and Sign(v) 6= F1.
Since the terms in Factors(t) are in normal form we have that all ri with i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
are in R1. Thus the left-hand side and the right-hand side of these rules are pure 1-terms.
By Lemma 2 the left-hand side of ri is not a variable x.
Thus u alien to t implies it is alien to all left-hand sides of rewrite rules applied. These
remarks lead to the following claim.
Claim 1 ti−1 →si ti implies ti−1δu,v =R1 tiδu,v.
Proof of the claim. Let pi be the position in ti−1 at which the rule si is applied and let
li be the left-hand side of ri and Θ be the set of positions of variables in li. Let Π be the set
of positions at which u appears as a subterm in ti−1. The above remarks imply u is alien to
li. Thus for all p ∈ Π we have either pi is not a prefix of p or there exists θ ∈ Θ such that
pi · θ is a prefix of p. This implies the claim. ♦
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Iterating the claim along the sequence of rule applications for normalizing t yields tδu,v =R
(t)↓δu,v by transitivity of =R. Since R is ground convergent this implies (tδu,v)↓ =R
((t)↓δu,v)↓. 
A ground term s is said to be bound by σ to the term t in U if there exists t ∈ U such
that (tσ)↓ = s. A ground term s which is not bound to any term in U is said to be free in
U . The following lemma permits us to define a new substitution after the replacement of a
free subterm of the solution σ.
Lemma 5 Let t be a term and σ be a normalized substitution. Assume s is free in Sub(t)
for σ and let σ′ = (σδs)↓. We have:
((tσ)↓δs)↓ = (tσ
′)↓
Proof. Since R is ground convergent it is sufficient to prove:
(tσ)↓δs =R tσ
′
For all variables x we have xσ′ =R x(σδs) by definition of σ
′, and thus:
tσ′ =R t(σδs)
Since s is free and normalized, there is no subterm r of t such that rσ = s. Thus:
t(σδs) =R (tσ)δs
Moreover we have (tσ)↓ =R tσ. Since σ is normalized we have Sub((tσ)↓) ⊆ (Sub(t)σ)↓ ∪
Sub(σ) and Sub(tσ) ⊆ Sub(t)σ ∪ Sub(σ). Since s is free and normalized it is neither in
Sub(t)σ nor in (Sub(t)σ)↓. Thus we have:
((tσ)↓)δs =R (tσ)δs
Hence we have (tσ)↓δs =R tσ
′ which completes the proof. 
Lemma 6 For all normal substitutions σ, for all terms m and for all s ∈ Sub((mσ)↓) one
of the following holds:
  s ∈ Cspe;
  There is u ∈ Sub(m) such that (uσ)↓ = s and Sign(u) = Sign(s);
  There exists x ∈ Var(m) such that s ∈ Sub(xσ).
Proof. Let m and s be two terms and let σ be a ground substitution such that s ∈
Sub((mσ)↓). We have
Sub((mσ)↓) ⊆ (Sub(m)σ)↓ ∪ Sub(Var(m)σ) ∪ Cspe
INRIA
Combining Intruder Theories 13
Assume there exists no x ∈ Var(m) such that s ∈ Sub(xσ) and s 6∈ Cspe. Let u ∈ Sub(m)
be minimal for the subterm relation such that (uσ)↓ = s. The above inclusion and s /∈
Sub(Var(m)σ) ∪ Cspe imply u is well-defined. If it is a free constant we have necessarily
u = s and Sign(u) = Sign(s) = ⊥. Assume now u is neither a constant or a variable and
thus Factors(u) is not empty.
By minimality of u we have s /∈ ((Sub(u) \ {u})σ)↓. Thus for all v in Sub(u) \ {u}
the above inclusion (replacing m by v) imply s /∈ Sub((vσ)↓). Consider now a bottom-up
normalisation of uσ stopping at factors of u and let t be the obtained term. By Lemma 3 and
s 6∈ Cspe∪Factors(t) we have Sign(t) = Sign(s). By definition of t we have Sign(t) = Sign(u)
and therefore there exists u ∈ Sub(m) such that (uσ)↓ = s and Sign(u) = Sign(s). 
3 Protocols, intruders and constraint systems
Security of a given protocol is assessed with respect to a class of environments in which
the protocol is executed. Dolev and Yao [19] have described the environment not in terms
of possible attacks on the protocol but by the deduction an intruder attacking a protocol
execution is able to perform.
In Subsection 3.1 we define an extension of Dolev-Yao’s model to arbitrary operators that
models the possible deductions of the intruder. In Subsection 3.2 we describe the execution
of a protocol within an hostile environment controlled by the intruder and in Subsection 3.3
we describe how we model this execution by constraint systems.
3.1 Intruder deduction systems
3.1.1 Deduction rules
We shall model messages as ground terms and intruders deduction rules as rewrite rules
on sets of messages representing the knowledge of an intruder. The intruder derives new
messages from a given (finite) set of messages by applying intruder rules. Since we assume
some equational axioms H are satisfied by functions symbols in the signature, all these
derivations have to be considered modulo the equational congruence =H generated by these
axioms.
An intruder deduction rule in our setting is specified by a term t in some signature G.
Given values for the variables of t the intruder is able to generate the corresponding instance
of t.
Definition 3 An intruder system I is given by a triple 〈G, S,H〉 where G is a signature,
S ⊆ T(G,X ) and H is a set of equations between terms in T(G,X ). To each t ∈ S we
associate a deduction rule Lt : Var(t) → t and Lt,g denotes the set of ground instances of
the rule Lt modulo H:
Lt,g = {l→ r | ∃σ, ground substitution on G, l = Var(t)σ and r =H tσ}
The set of rules LI is defined as the union of the sets L
t,g for all t ∈ S.
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Each rule l → r in LI defines an intruder deduction relation →l→r between finite sets
of terms. Given two finite sets of terms E and F we define E →l→r F if and only if l ⊆ E
and F = E ∪ {r}. We denote →I the union of the relations →l→r for all l → r in LI and
by →∗I the transitive closure of →I . We simply denote by → the relation →I when there is
no ambiguity about I.
The next result will allow us to restrict our study to deductions with normalized terms:
Lemma 7 We assume that R is a rewrite system that is terminating and confluent on
ground terms such that =R and =E are the same relations. Then given a set of ground terms
E and a ground term t, there is a deduction E → F iff there is a deduction (E)↓ → (F )↓.
For instance we can define I× = 〈{×, i, 1}, {x× y, i(x), 1}, E×〉 and we have a, b, c →I×
a, b, c, c× a.
A derivation D of length n, n ≥ 0, is a sequence of steps of the form E0 →I E0, t1 →I
· · · →I En with finite sets of ground terms E0, . . . En, and ground terms t1, . . . , tn, such
that Ei = Ei−1 ∪ {ti} for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. A derivation is without stutter if for all
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ti = tj implies i = j. The term tn is called the goal of the derivation. We
define E
I
to be equal to the set {t | ∃F s.t. E →∗I F and t ∈ F} i.e. the set of terms that
can be derived from E. If there is no ambiguity on the deduction system I we write E
instead of E
I
.
Let O be an o-completion of H. By Lemma 7 we will assume from now that all the
deduction rules generate terms that are normalized by →O and the goal and the initial set
are in normal form for →O.
3.1.2 Union of intruder deduction systems
Given a set of terms S ⊆ T(G,X ) we define the set of terms 〈S〉 to be the minimal set such
that S ⊆ 〈S〉 and for all t ∈ 〈S〉 and for all substitutions σ with image included in 〈S〉, we
have tσ ∈ 〈S〉. Hence terms in 〈S〉 are built by composing terms in S iteratively. We can
prove easily that the intruder systems I = 〈G, S,H〉 and J = 〈G, 〈S〉 ,H〉 define the same
sets of derivable terms, i.e. for all E we have E
I
= E
J
.
We want to consider now the union of 2 intruder systems: I1 = 〈F1, S1, E1〉 and I2 =
〈F2, S2, E2〉. In particular we are interested in the derivations obtained by using→I1 ∪ →I2 .
It can be noticed that 〈S1 ∪ S2〉 = 〈〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉〉. Hence by the remarks above the derivable
terms using 〈S1 ∪ S2〉 or 〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉 are the same. For technical reason it will be more
convenient to use 〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉 for defining the union of 2 intruder systems:
Definition 4 The union of the two intruder systems I1 = 〈F1, S1, E1〉 and I2 = 〈F2, S2, E2〉
is the intruder system U = 〈F1 ∪ F2, 〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉 , E1 ∪ E2〉 .
From now we assume that deduction steps refer to the intruder system U =
〈F1 ∪ F2, 〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉 , E1 ∪ E2〉.
INRIA
Combining Intruder Theories 15
3.1.3 Properties of one-step deductions
First we prove some properties that are local to a given deduction in a derivation.
To begin with, we prove that, informally, if the set of subterms changes after a deduction
of a term by a rule in Lu,g, then the only change is the addition of t and Sign(u) = Sign(t).
Lemma 8 Let E and F be two finite sets of normalized terms and let E →Lu,g F be a
deduction and assume that Sub(E)∪Cspe 6= Sub(F )∪Cspe. Then F = E, s, with Sub(F ) =
Sub(E) ∪ {s} and Sign(u) = Sign(s).
Proof. Let the rule applied be:
u1, u2, . . . , uk → (u(u1, . . . , uk))↓ = ti
and let v = u(u1, . . . , uk). Since E is normalized the ui are in normal form. Since u is pure,
by definition of factors we have Factors(v) ⊆ Sub(u1, . . . , uk)∪Cspe. We can conclude from
this:
  Sub((v)↓) ⊆ {(v)↓} ∪ Sub(u1, . . . , uk) ∪ Cspe
  If Sign(v) 6= Sign((v)↓) we have (v)↓ ∈ Cspe ∪ Sub(u1, . . . , uk) ⊆ Sub(E) ∪ Cspe by
Lemma 3.
The lemma then follows directly from Sub(E, (v)↓) ∪ Cspe 6= Sub(E) ∪ Cspe. 
Lemma 9 Let D be a derivation and l→ r ∈ Lu,g a rule applied in D. Then for each s ∈ l
if there is a rule ls → s ∈ L
v,g applied in D we can assume Sign(u) 6= Sign(v).
Proof. By contradiction. Let D be the set of derivations for which the lemma does not
hold and let D ∈ D with a minimal number of rules application that does not satisfy the
lemma. Let l → r ∈ Lu,g be the first of these rules. For any term s ∈ l such that there
exists a rule ls → s ∈ L
v,g in D we do the following construction:
Since u and v are in the same theory wlog we can assume u, v ∈ 〈S1〉 and let v
′ = v[x1 ←
u]. By definition of 〈S1〉 we have v
′ ∈ 〈S1〉. In L
v′,g there is a rule
li, lj \ {ti} → tj
By iterating this construction on l we build a rule matching the criterion. This contradicts
the minimality of D in D. Thus D is empty. 
The following lemma is a direct consequence of Lemma 8 that will be used throughout
this paper.
Lemma 10 Let D : E0 → . . . → En be a derivation where the Ei are normalized for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and assume there exists s ∈ Sub(Ei) \ (Sub(E0) ∪Cspe). Then there exists in
D a step Ej−1 →ls→s Ej with j ≤ i and ls → s ∈ L
u,g with Sign(u) = Sign(s).
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Proof. Consider the minimal indice j such that s ∈ Sub(Ej). By hypothesis we have j > 0
and j ≤ i. Moreover by minimality of j we have Sub(Ej) 6= Sub(Ej−1). Since s /∈ Cspe
Lemma 8 implies that Ej = Ej−1, s, and that if Ej−1 →ls→s= Ej with ls → s ∈ L
u,g then
Sign(u) = Sign(s). 
Lemma 11 Let l → r be a rule in Lu,g and s ∈ l with Sign(s) 6= Sign(u) and s 6= r. Then
(lδs)↓ → (rδs)↓ is also a rule in L
u,g.
Proof. Consider t = u(l). Its factors are in normal form, s, cmin are alien to t and s is a
factor of t and s 6= (t)↓. Therefore by Lemma 4 we have (tδs)↓ = (u((lδs)↓))↓. 
3.1.4 Well-formed derivations
A derivation E0 →U E0, t1 →U · · · →U En of intruder system U is well-formed if for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have ti ∈ Sub(E0, tn) ∪ Cspe; in other words every message generated by
an intermediate step either occurs in the goal, in the initial set of messages or is a special
constant. In next lemma we assume E and t are in normal form and that all terms produced
during a derivation are in normal form.
Lemma 12 A derivation of minimal length starting from E of goal t is well-formed.
Proof. Let n be the length of D, and let {t1, . . . , tn} be such that t = tn and
D : E → E, t1 → E, t1, t2 → . . .→ E, t1, . . . , tn
By minimality of D it is without stutter. By contradiction assume that i is the maximal
indice such that ti 6∈ Sub(E0, tn) ∪ Cspe. Since ti /∈ Sub(E0, tn) ∪ Cspe we have i < n.
By Lemma 10 we have ti /∈ Sub(E0) ∪ Cspe implies ti /∈ Sub(Ei−1) ∪ Cspe. Let li → ti ∈
Lu,g such that Ei−1 → Ei. By Lemma 8 this implies Sign(u) = Sign(ti).
By the minimality of D the term ti has to be used in the left-hand side of a subsequent
step in the derivation (otherwise the step producing ti can be avoided). Let us introduce the
non-empty set Ω of step indices i where ti has to be used in left-hand side. More precisely
Ω = {h |Eh−1 → Eh ∈ D and Eh−1 \ {ti} 6→ Eh \ {ti}}
Let j be the minimum element of Ω and let lj → tj ∈ L
v,g be the j-th deduction rule
in derivation D. Note that j > i and thus by maximality of i we have tj ∈ Sub(E0, tn).
Therefore ti /∈ Sub(tj). Moreover j ∈ Ω implies ti ∈ lj . By Lemma 9 we can assume u and
v are not in the same theory.
Since Sign(u) = Sign(ti) we have Sign(ti) 6= Sign(v). Thus by Lemma 11 there exists
a rule (ljδti)↓ → (tjδti)↓ in L
v,g. By minimality of j the only term r ∈ Ej−1 such that
ti ∈ Sub(r) is ti itself and thus (ljδti)↓ = lj , cmin \ {ti}. Since ti /∈ Sub(tj) we have
(tjδti)↓ = tj . Thus there exists in L
v,g a rule l′j → tj with l
′
j ⊆ Ej−1 and ti /∈ L
′
j . This
contradicts again j ∈ Ω.
Thus Ω is empty and the lemma follows. 
INRIA
Combining Intruder Theories 17
3.2 Protocol analysis
In this subsection we describe how protocol are modelled. In the following we only model
a single session of the protocol since it is well-known how to reduce several sessions to this
case. Our semantics follows the one by [17].
In Dolev-Yao’s model the intruder can intercept, block and/or redirect all messages sent
by honest agents. It is also able to send message by masquerading its identity and honest
agents may know its identity and wrongly assume it is honest and communicate with it on
that basis.
Thus it has complete control over the communication medium. We model this by con-
sidering the intruder is the network. Messages sent by honest agents are sent directly to the
intruder and messages received by the honest agents are always sent by the intruder. From
the intruder’s point of vue a finite execution of a protocol is therefore the interleaving of a
finite sequence of messages it has to send and a finite sequence of messages it receives (and
add to its knowledge).
We also assume the interaction of the intruder with one agent to be an atomic step. The
intruder sends a message m to an honest agent, this agent tests the validity of this message
and respond to it. Alternatively an agent may initiate an execution and in this case we
assume it reacts to a dummy message sent by the intruder.
A step is a triplet (recv(x); send(s);cond(e)) where x ∈ X , s ∈ T(G,X ) and e is a
set of equations between terms of T(G,X ). The meaning of a step is that upon receiving
message x, the honest agent checks the equations in e and sends the message s. An execution
of a protocol is a finite sequence of steps.
Example 3 Consider the following simple protocol:
A→ B : {M ⊕B}K
B → A : B
A→ B : K
B → A : M
Assuming the algebraic properties of ⊕, symmetric encryption se(, ) and symmetric decryp-
tion sd(, ) we model this protocol as:
recv(v1); send(se(M ⊕B,K));cond(v1 = cmin)
recv(v2); send(B);cond(∅)
recv(v3); send(K);cond(v3 = B)
recv(v4); send(sd(v2, v4)⊕B);cond(v4 = K)
recv(v5); send(cmin);cond(v5 = M)
Note that in our setting we can model that at some step i the message must match the
pattern ti by adding an equation vi
?
= ti to S.
In order to define whether an execution of a protocol is feasible we must first define when
a substitution σ satisfies a set of equations S.
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Definition 5 (Unification systems) Let H be a set of equational axioms on T(G,X ). An
H-Unification system S is a finite set of couples of terms in T(G,X ) denoted by (ui
?
=
vi)i∈{1,...,n}. It is satisfied by a ground substitution σ, and we note σ |= S, if for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n} uiσ =H viσ.
Let I=〈G, S,H〉 be an intruder system. A configuration is a couple 〈P,N〉 where P is a
finite sequence of steps and N is a set of ground terms (the knowledge of the intruder). From
the configuration 〈(recv(x); send(s);cond(e)) · P,N〉 a transition to (P ′, N ′) is possible
iff there exists a ground substitution σ such that xσ ∈ N
I
, σ |= e, N ′ = N ∪ {sσ} and
P ′ = Pσ. Trace based-security properties like secrecy can be reduced to the following
Execution feasability problem.
Execution feasability
Input: an initial configuration 〈P,N0〉
Output: SAT iff there exists a reachable configuration 〈∅,M〉
Protocol insecurity. A major security problem is to decide whether the intruder can
deduce a secret m from a finite sequence of message exchange P . This problem can be
reduced to the feasability of execution of the protocol by appending a last step
S = recv(x); send(cmin);cond(x = m)
to P . The problem of insecurity with respect to secrecy of m after P is equivalent to the
feasability of the execution of P · S. We now reduce the problem of execution feasability to
the resolution of constraint systems.
3.3 Constraints systems
We now model an execution of a protocol by a constraint problem C.
Definition 6 (Constraints systems) Let I = 〈G, S,H〉 be an intruder system. An I-
Constraint system C is denoted: ((Ei B vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) and it is defined by a sequence of
couples (Ei, vi)i∈{1,...,n} with vi ∈ X and Ei ⊆ T(G) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and Ei−1 ⊆ Ei for
i ∈ {2, . . . , n} and by an H-unification system S.
An I-Constraint system C is satisfied by a ground substitution σ if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
we have viσ ∈ Eiσ and if σ |=H S. If a ground substitution σ satisfies a constraint system
C we denote it by σ |=I C.
Constraint systems are denoted by C and decorations thereof. Note that if a substitution
σ is a solution of a constraint system C, by definition of constraints and of unification systems
the substitution (σ)↓O is also a solution of C. In the context of cryptographic protocols the
inclusion Ei−1 ⊆ Ei means that the knowledge of an intruder does not decrease as the
protocol progresses: after receiving a message an honest agent will respond to it. This
response can be added to the knowledge of an intruder who listens all communications.
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Example 4 We model the protocol of Example 3 by the following constraint system. First
we gather all conditions in an unification system S
S =
{
v1
?
= cmin , v3
?
= B , v4
?
= K , v5
?
= M
}
The protocol execution for intruder I with initial knowledge {cmin} is then expressed by the
constraint:
C = (( cmin B v1,
cmin, se(M ⊕B,K) B v2,
cmin, se(M ⊕B,K), B B v3,
cmin, se(M ⊕B,K), B,K B v4),
cmin, se(M ⊕B,K), B,K, sd(v2, v4)⊕B B v5,S)
We are not interested in general constraint systems but only in those related to protocols.
In particular we need to express that a message to be sent at some step i should be built
from previously received messages recorded in the variables vj , j < i, and from the initial
knowledge. To this end we define:
Definition 7 (Deterministic Constraints Systems) We say that an I-constraint system
((Ei B vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) is deterministic if ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have Var(Ei) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vi−1}
The decision problems we are interested in are the satisfiability and the ordered satisfi-
ability of intruder constraint systems.
Satisfiability
Input: an I-constraint system C
Output: Sat iff there exists a substitution σ such that: σ |=I C.
In order to be able to combine solutions of constraints in component theories to get
a solution for the full theory these solutions have to satisfy some ordering constraints too.
Intuitively, this is to avoid introducing cycle when building a global solution. This motivates
the following definition:
Ordered Satisfiability
Input: a constraint system C, X the set of all variables and C the set of all free
constants occurring in C and a linear ordering ≺ on X ∪ C.
Output: Sat iff there exists a substitution σ such that:{
σ |=I C
∀x ∈ X and ∀c ∈ C, x ≺ c implies c /∈ Subsyn(xσ)
The main result of this paper is a modularity result that can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1 If the ordered satisfiability problem is decidable for two intruders 〈F1, S1, E1〉
and 〈F2, S2, E2〉 for disjoint signatures F1 and F2 then the satisfiability problem is decidable
for the intruder 〈F1 ∪ F2, 〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉 , E1 ∪ E2〉.
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This result is obtained as a consequence of Algorithm 1 solving U-constraints using
algorithms for solving ordered satisfiability for intruders 〈F1, S1, E1〉 and 〈F2, S2, E2〉 given
in Section 5. The proof of the soundness and completeness of this algorithm relies on the
results of next section. We prove in Section 6 that it suffices to be able to solve deterministic
constraint systems in component theories.
4 Bound solutions of constraints systems
We recall that the intruder system U is the union of the two intruder systems 〈F1, S1, E1〉 and
〈F2, S2, E2〉. In this section we let C = ((Ei B vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) be a deterministic constraint
problem on signature F and σ be a normal substitution that satisfies C. We assume cmin ∈ E1
and Cspe ⊆ Sub(C). We are going to show in this section that a solution can be built uniquely
from subterms occuring in C.
From now we say a ground term is bound if it is bound by σ in Sub(C), unless otherwise
specified. In the same way a term is free if it is free in Sub(C). We say a substitution σ is
bound if for all variables x in its support all terms in Sub(xσ) are bound by σ in Sub(C).
In the rest of this section we first prove in Subsection 4.1 that if s is a free subterm of
σ then replacing it by cmin in derivations yields new derivations (i.e. no deduction power is
lost.) Then we prove in that if C is satisfiable there exists a solution σ of C which is bound
(Subsection 4.2).
4.1 Stability of derivations by replacement of free subterms
First we prove that when replacing a free term s in σ by the constant cmin we still obtain
a derivation. The proof of the following lemma relies on the hypothesis above that the
constraint system C is deterministic and σ is normal.
Lemma 13 Let s /∈ Cspe be a term such that s ∈ Sub((Ekσ)↓) for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Then
either there exists i < k such that s ∈ Sub(viσ) or there exists m ∈ Sub(Ek) such that
(mσ)↓ = s and in that case either Sign(s) = Sign(m) or m is a constant.
Proof. Since the constraint system is deterministic we have
Sub((Ekσ)↓) ⊆ (Sub(Ek)σ)↓ ∪ Sub(v1σ, . . . , vk−1σ) ∪ Cspe
Assume that there is no i < k such that s ∈ Sub(viσ). Then s /∈ Cspe implies there exists
m ∈ Sub(Ek) such that (mσ)↓ = s. By s /∈ Cspe and Lemma 6 there exists u ∈ Sub(m)
such that (uσ)↓ = s and Sign(u) = Sign(s). 
The next lemma is a one-step version of Lemma 15.
Lemma 14 Let G be a finite set of normalized terms with cmin ∈ G, let r and s be two
normalized terms with s /∈ Cspe, let lr be the rule r1, . . . , rn → r ∈ L
u,g, ls be the rule
s1, . . . , sm → s ∈ L
v,g. Assume moreover Sign(v) = Sign(s) and:
G→ls G, s→lr G, r, s
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Then either (rδs)↓ ∈ (Gδs)↓ or:
(Gδs)↓ →I (Gδs)↓, (rδs)↓
Proof. Assume (rδs)↓ /∈ (Gδs)↓ and thus s 6= r. By Lemma 9 we can safely assume
Sign(u) 6= Sign(v). Thus the assumption Sign(s) = Sign(u) implies Sign(s) 6= Sign(v). The
result is then a trivial consequence of Lemma 11. 
Lemma 15 will be applied with s a free term in a solution σ in Lemma 16. It permits us
to characterise minimal solutions of a constraint satisfaction problem.
Lemma 15 Let E and F be finite sets of normalized terms with cmin ∈ E. Let s, t be two
normalized terms not in Cspe with s ∈ E \ Sub(E) and t ∈ E ∪ F . We have:
(tδs)↓ ∈ ((E ∪ F )δs)↓
Proof. First let us note that if s /∈ Sub(E,F, t) then one has t = tδs, E = Eδs and
F = Fδs. Since E, F and t are normalized the result is trivial.
Following the hypothesis s /∈ Sub(E) we now assume s ∈ Sub(F, t). By Lemma 12 there
exists a well-formed derivation Ds without stutter starting from E of goal s:
E = E0 →I E1 →I · →I En
with s ∈ En. Since s /∈ Sub(E) ∪ Cspe Lemma 8 and the fact that Ds is without stutter
imply that the last rule is a rule ls → Lu,gs with s /∈ Sub(En−1) and Sign(u) = Sign(s).
Since the derivation is well-formed we have ls ⊆ Sub(E, s). Let H = En−1. We have E ⊆ H
and thus t ∈ H ∪ F ∪ {s}.
Let Dt be a well-formed derivation without stutter starting from H ∪ F ∪ {s} of goal
t and let D be the concatenation of the two sequences of rules in Ds and Dt, possibly
removing unnecessary rules (those creating a term already present). Then D defines a
derivation from E ∪ F of goal t. This derivation is without stutter by construction and
well-formed since Ds and Dt are well-formed and s ∈ Sub(F, t). Let (Gi)i∈{1,...,k} be the
sequence of sets appearing in this derivation. Let us prove that when allowing stutters (i.e.
(Giδs)↓ = (Gi+1δs)↓) the sequence (G0δs)↓ → · · · → (Gkδs)↓ is also a derivation.
By contradiction let G→ lr→rG
′ be the first transition inD such that (Gδs)↓ 6→L (G
′δs)↓
and (G′δs)↓ 6= (Gδs)↓. The rule has not been applied in Ds since otherwise either:
  s ∈ Sub(lr, r) implies r = s and thus (Gδs)↓ = (G
′δs)↓
  s /∈ Sub(lr, r) implies one can apply the same rule on (Gδs)↓ and this would lead to
(G′δs)↓.
Therefore the rule l→ r has been applied in Dt. Consider now the sequence:
G \ s→ls→s G→lr→r G, r = G
′
Since ls → s ∈ L
u,g with Sign(u) = Sign(s) Lemma 14 implies that either (G′δs)↓ = (Gδs)↓
or that (Gδs)↓ → (G
′δs)↓ is a valid transition, thus contradicting the choice of G and G
′. 
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4.2 Existence and properties of bound solutions
We now prove that if C is satisfiable then it is satisfied by a bound substitution. First we
prove it is possible to replace one free term s by the minimal constant.
Lemma 16 If there exists x ∈ Var(C) and s ∈ Sub(xσ) such that s is free in Sub(C) for σ
then (σδs)↓ |= C
Proof. Let σ′ = (σδs)↓. Note that s free implies s /∈ Cspe.
First let us prove that σ′ |= S. Since s is free in Sub(C) Lemma 5 implies that for all
equations s
?
= t in S we have (sσ)↓ = (tσ)↓ implies (sσ′)↓ = (tσ′)↓.
Let us now prove that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} if there is a derivation starting from (Eiσ)↓
of goal viσ then there is a derivation starting from (Eiσ
′)↓ of goal viσ
′. Let j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and consider the set:
Ωs = {i | s ∈ Sub((Eiσ)↓, viσ)}
If j /∈ Ωs we have (Ejσ)↓δs = (Ejσ)↓ and vjσ = vjσδs. Since s is free Lemma 5 implies
(Ejσ
′)↓ = (Ejσ)↓ and vjσ
′ = vjσ. Thus by assumption there exists a derivation starting
from (Ejσ
′)↓ of goal vjσ
′.
Thus if Ω = ∅ the Lemma is valid. Otherwise Ω 6= ∅ and we can consider the minimum
index i0 in Ω. By minimality of i0 and by Lemma 13 we have s /∈ Sub((Ei0σ)↓) and thus
s ∈ Sub(vi0σ). By Lemma 10 this implies s ∈ (Ei0σ)↓ .
For j ∈ Ω let Fj = (Ejσ)↓ \ (Ei0σ)↓. By (Ejσ)↓ = (Ei0σ)↓ ∪ Fj and s ∈ (Ei0σ)↓ \
Sub((Ei0σ)↓) we can apply Lemma 15 to obtain a derivation D
′
j starting from ((Ejσ)↓δs)↓
of goal vjσ
′. Since s is free Lemma 5 implies D′j is a derivation starting from (Ejσ
′)↓ of
goal vjσ
′.
Thus for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is a derivation starting from (Eiσ
′)↓ of goal viσ
′ 
The proof of next Proposition 1 is a direct consequence of Lemma 16 and exploits the
well-foundedness of the order < to prove it is possible to iteratively replace all free subterms.
Proposition 1 Let C be a satisfiable constraint system. There exists a normal bound sub-
stitution σ such that σ |= C.
Proof. Consider the set Σ of normal substitutions that satisfy C. By hypothesis Σ is not
empty. Let σ be a minimal substitution in Σ for the total ordering < on ground terms
extended on substitutions seen as multisets of ground terms. Let us prove σ is bound to C.
By contradiction assume there exists s free in Sub(σ) and let σ′ = (σδs)↓. By Lemma 16
we also have σ′ |= C. By monotony of < we have σ′ < σ. By definition of R we have
(σ′)↓ ≤ σ′. Thus (σ′)↓ ∈ Σ and (σ′)↓ < σ which contradicts the minimality of σ. 
Note that the notion of subterm used throughout this paper implies that for some theories
(such as abelian groups) we can have an infinite number of bound substitutions. It is thus
not possible to use Proposition 1 to directly guess a substitution satisfying a constraint
system C. However this notion is sufficient to permit us to combine decision procedures. In
next lemma we prove that instanciating the constraint C by a bound sunstitution does not
introduce any new subterm.
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Lemma 17
Sub((Sub(C)σ)↓) = (Sub(C)σ)↓
Proof. Let S = (Sub(C)σ)↓. We have S ⊆ Sub(S). The converse inclusion Sub(S) ⊆ S
follows directly from:
Sub((Sub(C)σ)↓) ⊆ (Sub(C)σ)↓ ∪ Sub(Var(C)σ) ∪ Cspe
Since σ is bound we have Sub(Var(C)σ) ⊆ (Sub(C)σ)↓ and by hypothesis we have Cspe ⊆
Sub(C). 
5 Combination of decision procedures
We introduce Algorithm 1 for solving satisfiability of constraint systems for the union U
of two intruders systems I1 = 〈F1, S1, E1〉 and I2 = 〈F2, S2, E2〉 with disjoint signatures
F1 and F2. We explain this algorithm in Subsection 5.1, then we prove its soundness
(Subsection 5.2) and completeness (Subsection 5.3). Finally we partially prove Theorem 1
in Subsection 5.4.
5.1 Combination algorithm
First let us explain Algorithm 1:
Step 2 The algorithm input is a U-Constraint system (D,S). An equational system S is
homogeneous if for all u
?
= v ∈ S, u and v are both pure 1-terms or both pure 2-terms.
It is well-known that equational systems can be transformed into equivalent (w.r.t.
satisfiability) homonogeneous systems. Thus we can assume that S is homogeneous
without loss of generality.
Step 3 abstracts every subterm t of C by a new variable ψ(t). A choice of ψ such that
ψ(t) = ψ(t′) will lead to solutions that identify t and t′.
Steps 4-6 assign non-deterministically a signature to the root symbol of the subterms of C in-
stanciated by a solution. The choice th(ψ(t)) = 0 corresponds to the situation where
t gets equal to a free constant.
Steps 7-10 choose and order non-deterministically the intermediate subterms in derivations that
witness that the solution satisfies the constraints in D.
Step 11 defines a constraint problem C ′ collecting the previous choices on subterms identifica-
tion, subterms signatures and derivation structures.
Step 12 splits the problem S ′ in two pure subproblems.
Step 13 splits non-deterministically the problem D′, that is we select for each E B v in D′ an
intruder system to solve it.
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Step 14 guesses an ordering on variables: this ordering will preclude the value of a variable
from being a subterm of the value of a smaller variable. This is used to avoid cycles
in the construction of the solution.
Step 15 solves independantly the 2 pure subproblems obtained at steps 12-13. In Ci the vari-
ables q with th(q) 6= i will be considered as constants.
Algorithm 1 Combination Algorithm
1: SolveU (C)
2: Let C = ((Ei B vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) with S homogeneous.
3: Choose ψ an application from Sub(C) to X \Var(C)
and let Q = ψ(Sub(C))
4: for all q ∈ Q do
5: Choose a theory th(q) ∈ {0, 1, 2}
6: end for
7: for i = 1 to n do
8: Choose Qi ⊆ Q
9: Choose a linear ordering over the elements of Qi say (qi,1, . . . , qi,ki)
10: end for
11: Let C′ = (D′,S ′) where{
S ′ = S ∪
{
z
?
= ψ(z) | z ∈ Sub(C)
}
D′ = ∆1, . . . ,∆i, . . .∆n
and ∆i = (Ki, Q
<j
i B qi,j)j∈{1,...,ki}, (Ki, Qi B ψ(vi)) with{
Ki = ψ(Ei) ∪
⋃i−1
j=1Qj
Q<ji = qi,1, qi,2, . . . , qi,j−1
12: Split S ′ into S1,S2 such that S
′ = S1 ∪ S2 and:

S1 =
{
z
?
= z′ ∈ S ′ | z, z′are pure 1-terms
}
S2 =
{
z
?
= z′ ∈ S ′ | z, z′are pure 2-terms
}
13: Split non-deterministically D′ into D1,D2
14: Choose a linear ordering ≺ over Q.
15: Solve Ci = (Di,Si) for intruder Ii with linear ordering ≺ for i ∈ {1, 2}
16: if both are satisfied then
17: Output: Satisfied
18: end if
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As in previous section we assume, with the notations of the algorithm, Cspe ⊆ Sub(C)
and cmin ∈ E1. Recall that we say a normal substitution σ is bound if for all variables x
with xσ 6= x and for all t ∈ Sub(xσ) there exists u ∈ Sub(C) such that (uσ)↓ = t.
We are now ready to show that Algorithm 1 is sound and complete.
5.2 Correctness
The soundness of Algorithm 1 is a consequence of the two results below. Together they show
that if the algorithm produces satisfiable Ii-constraints (i = 0, 1) at Step15 then the input
U-constraint is satisfiable. The notations below refer to the ones in Algorithm 1.
Lemma 18 If there exists C ′ satisfiable at Step 11 then C is satisfiable.
Proof. Assume there exists C ′ chosen from C as in the algorithm and a substitution σ such
that σ |=U C
′. We can check easily that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
1. for all elements t of Qiσ there exists a derivation Dt from ψ(Ei)σ of goal t;
2. there exists a derivation Dvi starting from ψ(Ei)σ ∪Qiσ of goal ψ(vi)σ;
3. the concatenation of all former derivations yields a derivation starting in ψ(Ei)σ of
goal ψ(vi)σ.
Since σ is solution of S ′ and σ |= S, for all t, t′ ∈ Sub(C) we have (tσ)↓ = (t′σ)↓ if
ψ(t) = ψ(t′). Hence there are derivations starting from (Eiσ)↓ of goal viσ for all i ∈ {1, ..n},
respectively. Therefore σ |=U C. 
Now we prove that the combination part is sound. This proof follows the lines of the
soundness proof for the combination of unification algorithms by [4].
Proposition 2 Assume that at Step 15 for i = 1, 2, σi is a solution of Ci = (Di,Si) for
intruder Ii. Then we can build a solution σ of C
′ for intruder U at Step 11.
Proof. We can assume up to renaming that σi maps every variable of Ci to a term that
contains new variables (away from C) or variables x with th(x) 6= i that are considered as
free constants in Ci. Let us define σ by induction on ≺. Let x be the least variable for ≺
and i ∈ {0, 1, 2} such that th(x) = i. We define xσ = xσi. Assume now that all yσ for
y ≺ x have been defined and that th(x) = i. If i = 0 then xσ = x. Else, since σi satisfies
the linear order restriction, the variables y1, . . . , ym of index j 6= i that occurs in xσi (and
considered as free constants in Ci) have to be smaller that x with respect to ≺. Hence by
induction σ is already defined on y1, . . . , ym and we can take xσ = xσiσ (considering now
the yi as variables). We can show as in [4] that σ |= S
′.
Now let us consider EBv an element of Di. Since σi is a solution of Ci we have a derivation
Eσi →
∗
Ii
vσi. By replacing in this derivation all the variables z such that th(z) 6= i (that
were considered as free constants in Ci) by zσ we get a derivation Eσ →
∗
U vσ. This reasoning
applies to all constraints in D1 ∪D2 and therefore σ is a solution of D
′ and finally of C′ too.

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5.3 Completeness
Proposition 3 If C satisfiable then there exists C1 and C2 satisfiable at Step 15 of the
algorithm.
Proof. First let us prove that the 11 first steps of the algorithm preserve satisfiability.
Assume C is satisfiable. By Proposition 1 there exists a normal bound substitution σ which
satisfies C. Define ψ to be a function such that ψ(t) = ψ(t′) if and only if (tσ)↓ = (t′σ)↓.
Thus by Lemma 17 there exists a bijection φ from Q to Sub((Sub(C)σ)↓). We let th(q) = i
if Sign(φ(q)) = Fi and th(q) = 0 if Sign(φ(q)) = ⊥. Note that by the construction of S
′ and
the choice of ψ we can extend σ on Q by qσ = (ψ−1(q)σ)↓.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} by Lemma 12 we can consider a well-formed derivationDi starting
from Fi = (Eiσ)↓ and of goal gi = viσ:
Di : Fi →U Fi, ri,1 →U · · · →U Fi, ri,1, . . . , ri,ki →U Fi, ri,1, . . . , ri,ki , gi
We have Sub(Fi, gi) ⊆ Sub((Sub(Cσ))↓). Since the derivation is well-formed we have
{ri,1, . . . , ri,ki} ⊆ Sub(Fi, gi). By Proposition 1, Sub((Sub(Cσ))↓) = (Sub(Cσ))↓ Thus the
function φ−1 is defined for each ri,j . Let qi,j = φ
−1(ri,j) and Qi be the sequence of the qi,j .
The algorithm will non-deterministically produce a C ′ corresponding to these choices and
satisfied by σ (extended over Q by qσ = q˜) by construction.
Since S is satisfiable, following the lines of F. Baader and K. Schulz [4] permits to prove
that S1 and S2 are satisfiable with the linear constant restriction ≺ chosen such that q ≺ q
′
implies q′σ is not a subterm of qσ.
We choose the sequence of constraints in D1 (resp. D2) to be the subsequence of con-
straints F B q from D′ such that the corresponding transition in the solution was performed
by a rule in Lu,g with Sign(u) = F1 (resp. F2). By construction these two systems are
satisfiable. 
5.4 Combining solutions of subsystems
We can now prove the main theorem of this article. It is stated for the combination of two
intruders but can easily generalized to n intruders over disjoint signatures F1, . . . ,Fn.
Theorem 1 If the ordered satisfiability problem is decidable for two intruders 〈F1, S1, E1〉
and 〈F2, S2, E2〉 for deterministic constraint problems over disjoint signatures F1 and F2 then
the satisfiability problem is decidable for deterministic constraint problems for the intruder
〈F1 ∪ F2, 〈S1〉 ∪ 〈S2〉 , E1 ∪ E2〉.
Proof. Propositions 3 and 2 imply that if the ordered satisfiability problem are decidable
for two intruders I1 and I2 over disjoint signature and for arbitrary constraint problems
then the satisfiability problem is decidable for the union of these two intruders and for
deterministic constraint problems.
In Section 6 we prove that it is sufficient to assume that ordered satisfiability problems are
decidable for each intruder for deterministic constraint problems to derive the decidability
for their union. 
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6 Deriving deterministic constraint systems
We now prove it suffices to solve deterministic constraint systems with ordering constraints
for intruders 〈F1, S1, E1〉 and 〈F2, S2, E2〉 in order to be able to solve deterministic constraint
systems for their union U .
6.1 Structure of bound solutions
These results will be used in Proposition 4.
Let C = ((Ei B vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) be a deterministic constraint problem on signature F
satisfiable for intruder system U . By Proposition 1 there exists a bound substitution σ such
that σ |=U C. As usual we assume cmin ∈ E1 and Cspe ⊆ Sub(C). We also define:{
Zi = Sub((Sub(Ei)σ)↓) ∪ Sub(viσ)
Z = ∪ni=1Zi
Intuitively Z is the set of terms that play a role in the derivations. We say a term m is a
prefix of a term t if (mσ)↓ = t and Sign(m) = Sign(t).
For the purification of a constraint system we will need to order the terms in (Sub(C)σ)↓
according to the indice of the (instanciated) constraint where they occur for the first time.
Given a term t ∈ Z we introduce its indice ind(t) which informally marks the first time t
appears.
Definition 8 For all t ∈ Z we define ind(t) to be the first i such t ∈ Sub((Sub(Ei)σ)↓, viσ).
If t ∈ (Sub(C)σ)↓ \ Z we define ind(t) = n+ 1.
Given a term t ∈ Z we say that t is past-bound if there exists a prefix of t in Sub(Ei).
We say a term t is past-free if it is not past-bound. Note that cmin is past-bound of indice
1 by hypothesis. First let us reformulate Lemma 6 with the indice for terms not in Cspe.
Lemma 19 Let u ∈ Sub(Ej) and s /∈ Cspe be in Sub((uσ)↓). Then either there exists a
prefix of s in Sub(u) or ind(s) < j.
Proof. By Lemma 6 and s /∈ Cspe either there exists a prefix of s in Sub(u) or there exists
x ∈ Var(u) with s ∈ Sub(xσ). In the latter case, since the protocol is deterministic we have
x ∈ {v1, . . . , vj−1} and therefore ind(s) ≤ j − 1. 
A direct consequence of this lemma is that if s is past-free of indice i ≤ n there is no
w ∈ Sub(Ei) with (wσ)↓ = s. Since the constraint system is deterministic this implies in
turn that there is no w ∈ Sub(Ei) with s ∈ Sub((wσ)↓). Next Lemma is also a restatement
of Lemma 10 with the notions of past-free and past-bound terms.
Lemma 20 Let t /∈ Cspe be past-free of indice i ≤ n and Di : F1 →
∗ Fk be a derivation
starting from (Eiσ)↓ of goal viσ.
Then there exists j ∈ {2, . . . , k} such that Fj−1 →Lu,g Fj with Sign(u) = Sign(t) and for all
j′ < j we have t /∈ Sub(Fj′).
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Proof. Let t be past-free of indice i. By Lemma 19 there exists no u ∈ Sub(Ei) with
t ∈ Sub((uσ)↓). Thus t past-free of indice i implies t ∈ Sub(viσ) \ Sub((Sub(Ei)σ)↓)
and thus t ∈ Sub(viσ) and t /∈ Sub((Eiσ)↓). Thus the lemma is a direct consequence of
Lemma 10. 
Remark. Let t ∈ Sub(C) such that ind((tσ)↓) ≤ n. Let us anticipate on the choices
during the split into two constraint problems in Algorithm 3. On the one hand if (tσ)↓ is
past-free then Lemma 20 and σ solution imply that the first time the class of t will appear
as a subterm of a constraint it will appears on the right-hand side of a constraint (as a qi,j)
and this constraint will have to solved in Ci with Sign(t) = Fi. On the other hand if t is
past-bound we will show in Lemma 21 how t can be partially infered from the subterms of C.
Algorithm 2 permits to compute this partial inference once the first choices of Algorithm 3
have been made.
Given a term t ∈ Z of indice i ∈ n next lemma states it is possible to compute a special
prefix of t.
Lemma 21 Let t ∈ Z \ Cspe be a past-bound term of indice i ≤ n. One can compute from
Sub(C) a prefix m of t such that Var(m) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vi−1} and for each u ∈ Factors(m) either
(uσ)↓ is past-free and of indice < i or is a prefix of (uσ)↓.
Proof. By contradiction let i be minimal such that there exists a past-bound term of indice
i for which the lemma does not hold. Let mt ∈ Sub(Ei) be minimal for the subterm relation
such that the lemma does not hold for t = (mtσ)↓. By minimality of mt and ind(t) = i
Lemma 19 implies mt is a prefix of t. Let Ωt be the set of prefix of t computable from C
(but not necessarily in Sub(C)). Since the constraint problem is deterministic mt ∈ Ωt and
thus Ωt 6= ∅.
Given m ∈ Ωt let µ(m) the number of factors u of m such that (uσ)↓ is past-bound and
Sign(u) 6= Sign((uσ)↓). Let m ∈ Ωt be such that µ(m) is minimal.
Claim 1 µ(m) = 0.
Proof of the claim. By contradiction assume µ(m) > 0. This imlplies there exists u ∈
Factors(m) such that Sign(u) 6= Sign((uσ)↓). Let j be minimal such that u ∈ Sub(Ej) and
let s = (uσ)↓. By definition we have j ≤ i and ind(s) ≤ j. By Lemma 19 there exists a
prefix w of s in Sub(Eind(s)). Moreover in case ind(s) = j there is one such prefix in Sub(u).
In both cases by minimality of i and of mt we can conclude that one can compute a term
ms verifying the lemma for s. Note that either s is a constant (and thus s = ms) or
Sign(ms) = Sign(mt). In both cases m cannot be a factor of ms. Let m
′ be the term m
where the factor u is replaced by ms. We have µ(m
′) = µ(m)− 1 + µ(ms) = µ(m)− 1 and
therefore µ(m′) < µ(m). This contradicts µ(m) minimal and non-zero. ♦
As a consequence of Claim 1 u ∈ Factors(m) and Sign(u) 6= Sign((uσ)↓) imply (uσ)↓
is past-free. Let s = (uσ)↓. By Lemma 19 either there exists a prefix w of s in Sub(u) or
s ∈ Sub(xσ) for some x ∈ Var(u). In the first case s is past-free imply by definition that
ind(s) < i. In the second case we have x ∈ {v1, . . . , vi−1} and therefore ind(s) < i. 
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Functions defined. A substitution σ defines a mapping fσ from Sub(C) to (Sub(Cσ))↓.
Let Q be a finite set of variables away from C of size |(Sub(Cσ))↓|. There is a bijection gσ,Q
from (Sub(Cσ))↓ to Q. The functions fσ and gσ,Q define a mapping ψ from Sub(C) to Q
such that ψ(t1) = ψ(t2) iff (t1σ)↓ = (t2σ)↓. We now define some functions on Q. In this
context QZ is the subset of variables q ∈ Q such that g
−1
α,Q(q) ∈ Z.
First we define the function ind(·)on Q with
ind(q) =
{
ind(g−1α,Q(q)) If q ∈ Z
n+ 1 Otherwise
Note that the actual value (uσ)↓ is not needed to compute ind(ψ(u)) for u ∈ Sub(C). It
suffices to know (or guess) ψ and the subterm relation on (Sub(Cσ))↓ for the case where
(uσ)↓ is a past-free strict subterm of viσ.
We now define a function type(·) that associates to a variable q of Q a mark depending on
whether g−1α,Q(q) is past-free or past-bound. Note that this function may again be computed
as soon as the subterm relation on (Sub(Cσ))↓ is known.
type(q) =
{
past-bound If q ∈ Z and g−1α,Q(q) past-bound
past-free Otherwise
Note that a function ϕp(·) that associates to a variable q ∈ Q a term ϕp(q) satisfying
the Lemma 21 may be computed as soon as ψ and type(·) or known. There exists several
possible choices for ϕp(·) depending on the order of computation but they all are valid. The
Algorithm 2 permits to compute ϕp(·) for all terms in QZ .
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to compute ϕp(·)
for all q ∈ Q with type(q) = past-free do
ϕp(q) = q
end for
while there exists q ∈ Q with ϕp(q) undefined do
Let m ∈ Sub(C) with ϕp(ψ(m)) undefined
if ϕp(·)defined on all factors of m then
Let ϕp(ψ(m)) be m where all factors u have been replaced by ϕp(ψ(u))
end if
end while
In Algorithm 2 the condition at Step 6 is always satisfied for constants of Sub(C).
6.2 Revised combination algorithm
Our aim is to prove that at Step 15 of Algorithm 1 it is sufficient to try to solve the Ci only
in the case they are deterministic. In order to do this we restrict the choices in order to
demonstrate why this is possible. We also limit the guessing part by adding a line where
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the subterm relation R on (Sub(Cσ))↓ is guessed. This gives the restricted combination
Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Combination Algorithm for CP satisfiability
1: SolveU (C)
2: Let C = ((Ei B vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) with S homogeneous.
3: Choose ψ an application from Sub(C) to X \Var(C) and let Q = ψ(C).
4: Choose a partial ordering R over Q2
5: for all q ∈ Q do
6: Choose a theory th(q) ∈ {0, 1, 2}
7: Compute the indice ind(q) ∈ {1, . . . , n, n+ 1}
8: Compute type(q) ∈ {past-free,past-bound}
9: Compute ϕp(q)
10: end for
11: for i = 1 to n do
12: Choose Qi ⊆ Q
13: Choose a linear ordering over the elements of Qi say (qi,1, . . . , qi,ki)
14: end for
15: Let C′ = (D′,S ′) where{
S ′ = S ∪
{
z
?
= ψ(z) | z ∈ Sub(C)
}
D′ = ∆1, . . . ,∆i, . . .∆n
and ∆i = (Ki, Q
<j
i B qi,j)j∈{1,...,ki}, (Ki, ϕp(Qi) B ψ(vi)) with{
Ki = ϕp(ψ(Ei)) ∪
⋃i−1
j=1 ϕp(Qj)
Q<ji = ϕp(qi,1), ϕp(qi,2), . . . , ϕp(qi,j−1)
16: Split S ′ into S1,S2 such that S
′ = S1 ∪ S2 and:

S1 =
{
z
?
= z′ ∈ S ′ | z, z′are pure 1-terms
}
S2 =
{
z
?
= z′ ∈ S ′ | z, z′are pure 2-terms
}
17: Split D′ into D1,D2
18: Choose a linear ordering ≺ over Q.
19: Solve Ci = (Eqi,Si) over Fi with linear restriction ≺ for i ∈ {1, 2}
20: if both are deterministic and satisfied then
21: Output: Satisfied
22: end if
We are now ready to show that Algorithm 3 is complete. The correctness follows from
Proposition 2 as the added features only restrict the possible choices in the algorithm.
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6.3 Completeness
Proposition 4 If C is satisfiable then Algorithm 3 will generate 2 deterministic and satis-
fiable constraint systems C1 and C2 for I1 and I2 at Step 20.
Proof. Assume C is satisfiable. By Proposition 1 it has a normal bound solution σ.
Let K = (Sub(Cσ))↓. There exists a surjective function φ1 from Sub(C) to K such that
φ(t) = (tσ)↓. Moreover there exists an injection φ2 between K and X \ Var(C). We denote
q˜ = φ−12 (q). Consider the following choices:
  we choose ψ = φ2 ◦ φ1, and let Q = ψ(Sub(C));
  we choose R such that for any t, t′ ∈ K we have t strict subterm of t′ iff φ2(t)Rφ2(t
′).
  The theory chosen for q ∈ Q is Sign(q˜);
  The computation of the indice and of whether q˜ is past-free or past-bound depends
only on ψ and on the subterm relation in K. It can thus be computed once knowing
R and ψ;
  ϕp(q) can be computed following Lemma 21;
  For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} consider a well-formed derivation Di starting from Fi = (Eiσ)↓
and of goal gi = viσ:
Di : Fi → Fi, ri,1 → · · · → Fi, ri,1, . . . , ri,ki → Fi, ri,1, . . . , ri,ki , gi
Since the derivation is well-formed we have:{
{ri,1, . . . , ri,ki} ⊆ Sub(Fi, gi)
Sub(Fi, gi) ⊆ (Sub(Cσ))↓
The function φ2 is defined for each ri,j . Let qi,j = φ2(ri,j) and Qi be the sequence of
the qi,j .
From now on we assume these choices and computations have been performed.
Claim 1 C′ is satisfiable at Step 15.
Proof of the claim. Given the choices made it suffices to remark that by construction
of ϕp(·) we have qσ = (ϕp(q)σ)↓ (see Lemma 21).
Thus the algorithm will non-deterministically produce a C ′ corresponding to these choices
and satisfied by σ (extended over Q by qσ = q˜) by construction. ♦
Since S is satisfiable, following the lines of F. Baader and K. Schulz [4] permits to prove
that S1 and S2 are satisfiable with the linear constraint restriction ≺ chosen such that q ≺ q
′
implies q˜′ is not a subterm of q˜.
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Splitting. We consider the split choice in which the sequence of constraints in Eq1 (resp.
Eq2) is the subsequence of constraints FBq from D
′ such that the corresponding transition in
the solution was performed by a rule in Lu,g with Sign(u) = F1 (resp. F2). By construction
and since (ϕp(q)σ)↓ = qσ these two systems are satisfiable. Then the Ci are purified. This
means that if ϕp(q) is in theory Fj with j 6= i we replace it by q.
In a system Ci, if ϕp(q) 6= q and th(q) 6= i it can be replaced by q before solving Ci. Then
the variable symbols q such that th(q) 6= i will be considered as constants when solving the
system Ci.
Let us now prove the systems Ci are deterministic.
Claim 2 Let q ∈ Q past-bound, q′ ∈ Var(ϕp(q)) with th(q
′) = th(q). Then ind(q′) < ind(q)
and q′ is past-free.
Proof of the claim. Since q is past-bound ϕp(q) is defined and different from q. Let
i = ind(q˜) ∈ {1, . . . , n} and let q′ ∈ Var(ϕp(q)) with th(q
′) = 1. Let m be the term chosen
and u ∈ Factors(m) such that ψ(u) = q′. We have Sign(u) 6= Sign(m). Thus if q′ is not
past-free we have th(q′) 6= th(q). We can conclude that q′ is past-free and therefore by
Lemma 21 (used on Eind(q)) ind(q
′) < ind(q). ♦
Claim 3 The constraint systems Ci = (Eqi,Si) (i = 1, 2) derived with the above choices are
deterministic.
Proof of the claim. First we note that q is a variable of Eqi if th(q) = i. Let Eqi =
(E′j B qj)j and define Vj = {q1, . . . , qj}. By contradiction assume the set J of indices j such
that Var(E′j) 6⊆ Qj−1 is not empty and let j be the minimum of J and let m ∈ E
′
j such that
Var(m) 6⊆ Qj−1 and finally let q such that ϕp(q) = m.
If q is past-free then m = q and thus q ∈ Ej \ Qj−1. But the first time a past-free term t
appears in a derivation it is deducted with a rule in Lu,g with Sign(u) = Sign(t). Thus by
the choice during the split we have a constraint Ej′ B q in Eq1 with j
′ < j. This contradicts
q /∈ Qj−1.
Else we have m 6= q but by Claim 2 each q′ ∈ Var(ϕp(q)) is past-free and ind(q
′) < ind(q).
Thus by the choice during the split there exists a constraint Ej′ B q in Eq1 with j
′ < j.
Therefore j /∈ J and thus J = ∅, which proves the claim. ♦

7 Application to Security Protocols
In order to combine constraint solving algorithms for subtheories we only need to show that
ordered satisfiability is decidable in each component theory. To illustrate the benefit of our
approach we show that this is the case for several theories encoding useful properties of
cryptographic primitives (pair, xor, exponential, encryption). A consequence of our main
result Theorem 1 is that we can decide the security of (finite sessions of) any protocol
employing these primitives even assuming their algebraic properties and even if they are
employed all together.
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7.1 Abelian group operators
We consider in this subsection the case of an intruder I× = 〈F×, S×, E×〉, where F× is the
signature {i,×, 1}, S× is the set of terms {i(x), x× y, 1} and with the equational theory:
E×


(x× y)× z = x× (y × z)
x× y = y × x
1× x = x
x× i(x) = 1
We reduce decidability of I×-constraints to satisfiability of affine systems of equations
on Z. This reduction is performed in two steps. First we prove that it suffices to consider
ground sets Ei in the constraints, and thus that the vi are linear combination of ground
terms. Second the unification system is translated to a system of affine equations over Z.
Lemma 22 One can compute C ′ = ((E′i B vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) from C such that
  σ |= C iff σ |= C′
  for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the set E ′i is ground
This leads to next proposition.
Proposition 5 The ordered satisfiability problem for deterministic constraints and intruder
I× is decidable in NPTIME.
7.2 XOR operator
We consider the intruder I⊕ = 〈F⊕, {x⊕ y, 0}, E⊕〉 with the signature F⊕ = {0, · ⊕ ·} and
with equational theory:
E⊕


(x⊕ y)⊕ z = x⊕ (y ⊕ z)
x⊕ y = y ⊕ x
0⊕ x = x
x⊕ x = 0
Let C = ((Ei B vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) be a deterministic constraint problem for I⊕. Lemma 22
can be adapted to this case. The main difference is that affine systems are over (Z/2Z). We
refer to [20] for a more detailed description of the translation from unification problems to
linear systems and of the resolution of such systems.
Proposition 6 The ordered satisfiability problem for deterministic constraints and intruder
I⊕ is decidable in PTIME.
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7.3 Exponential operator
For simplicity of exposition we assume that all exponentiations are computed in the same
modulus. We consider the signature Fexp = {exp(·, ·), i(·), · × ·} and the following equational
theory over Fexp to take into account the properties of the exponential:
Eexp


exp(x, 1) = x
exp(exp(x, y), z) = exp(x, y × z)
(x× y)× z = x× (y × z)
x× y = y × x
1× x = x
x× i(x) = 1
The deduction system of the intruder is modelled by Sexp = {x× y, i(x), exp(x, y)}.
We can now define Iexp = 〈Fexp, Sexp, Eexp〉. Following [26] the satisfiability problem for
deterministic constraint systems for this intruder can be reduced to the satisfiability problem
for an abelian group operator.
Proposition 7 The ordered satisfiability problem for deterministic constraints and intruder
Iexp is decidable in NPTIME.
7.4 Equational Dolev-Yao theory with explicit decryption
We consider now the Dolev-Yao intruder IDY = 〈FDY , SDY , EDY 〉 over the signature FDY =
{〈·, ·〉 , pi1(·), pi2(·), se(·, ·), sd(·, ·)} with deduction system defined by SDY = {〈x, y〉 , pi1(x), pi2(x), se(x, y), sd(x, y)}
and the equational theory:
EDY


pi1(〈x, y〉) = x
pi2(〈x, y〉) = y
sd(se(x, y), y) = x
First we note that we can get from EDY a convergent and finite rewrite system RDY
simply by orienting the axioms from left to right. Thanks to Theorem 8.5. of Schmidt-
Schauss [28] satisfiability of equational systems modulo EDY is decidable even in presence of
linear constant restrictions. The idea is that the so-called narrowing procedure modulo RDY
terminates (since rules right-hand sides are variables) and is complete for solving equations
modulo EDY with linear constant restrictions.
The algorithm of [3] for deciding intruder IDY -constraints can be adapted to generate
a finite and complete set of symbolic solutions. Then we can use the constant elimination
technique of [28] to solve the ordered satisfiability problem: we apply narrowing (i.e. instan-
ciating and rewriting) to the complete set of symbolic solutions provided by [3] and then we
eliminate the resulting substitutions that do not satisfy the constant restrictions.
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8 Conclusion
We have proposed an algorithm for combining decision procedures for intruder constraints
on disjoint signatures. This algorithm allows for a modular treatment of algebraic operators
in protocol analysis and a better understanding of complexity issues in the domain. Since
only constraint satisfiability is required from the intruder subtheories the approach should
permit one to handle more complex operators.
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